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ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze the mediating cognitive effects of vertical information sharing in the budgeting process on 
the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance. The behavioral literature in the area of 
accounting has diverged regarding the cognitive effects of budgetary participation on managerial performance. Evidence 
found in this literature reveals that there are possible intervening variables in this relationship that may influence the 
cognitive effects of participation on performance. Considering that budgetary participation can affect the cognition and 
performance of individuals at work, it is relevant to analyze the budget management practices adopted by organizations 
and the effects they have on individuals with budgetary responsibilities. The evidence found shows that an organization’s 
budgetary configuration influences the way information sharing will occur and will consequently have cognitive effects on 
managerial performance. This descriptive study was conducted by collecting data and employing a quantitative approach 
to analyze them, using structural equations modeling. The research sample comprised 316 respondents with budgetary 
responsibilities who carry out the role of controller, controlling manager, or controlling coordinator in Brazilian companies. 
The results show that budgetary participation positively influences vertical information sharing, which presented a positive 
influence on managerial performance. Vertical information sharing results from cognitive effects of budgetary participation. 
Higher levels of vertical information sharing are reflected in lower role ambiguity and better managerial performance. Even 
if individuals with budgetary responsibilities perceive the existence of information asymmetry in the work environment, 
its effects on performance are not significant. These results contribute to understanding the mediating cognitive effects of 
information sharing on the relationship between participation and performance, revealing that the effects of participation 
on performance may not occur based on a simple causality relationship, but instead based on certain conditioning factors.
Keywords: budgetary participation, vertical information sharing, managerial performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The management control procedures often used in 
organizations involve the participation of managers and 
their subordinates (Baiman & Evans, 1983; 2002; Silva 
& Gomes, 2011). Standing out among these is budgetary 
participation (Silva & Gomes, 2011). Chen (2003) and Kyj 
and Parker (2008) explain that budgetary participation 
uses the budget as a communication channel between 
managers and their subordinates.
This process encourages dialogue and communication 
between superiors and subordinates, creating a common 
cognitive base and facilitating knowledge transfer (Chong, 
Eggleton & Leong, 2005; Parker & Kyj, 2006). Despite 
budgetary participation enabling the information of 
subordinates to be incorporated into the performance 
evaluation system, one difficulty in this process is when 
the subordinate cannot communicate all the information 
to the superior or is not willing to communicate it honestly 
(Covaleski, Evans, Luft & Shields, 2006; Mia & Patiar, 
2002), thus creating information asymmetry.
Individuals are constantly exposed to a variety of 
expectations from themselves when carrying out their 
activities, and these expectations have influenced how 
subordinates understand their organizational functions 
(Marginson & Ogden, 2005). Unclear or vague expectations 
can cause role ambiguity (Kim, Murrmann & Lee, 2009).
Role ambiguity is influenced by organizational 
characteristics, such as the type of organizational 
structure and the personal characteristics of each 
individual (Marginson & Ogden, 2005; Zonatto, Weber 
& Nascimento, 2019). In companies that present role 
ambiguity, budgetary participation can offer comfort 
and assurance to subordinates (Chenhall & Brownell, 
1988; Marginson & Ogden, 2005), which can attenuate 
possible negative effects of this variable over individuals’ 
managerial performance in their work activities. For Mia 
and Patiar (2002), managerial performance is related to 
carrying out successful management functions. 
However, the participation of subordinates in budgetary 
processes does not ensure that the levels of information 
asymmetry and role ambiguity that exist in a company 
will be reduced and the desired managerial performance 
achieved (Zonatto et al., 2019). It is understood that 
this will only be accomplished when there is vertical 
information sharing (Parker & Kyj, 2006). Thus, it follows 
that it is the information sharing in the budgeting process 
that determines the cognitive effects of participation 
on performance, and not only the level of participation 
(Nouri & Parker, 1998; Parker & Kyj, 2006).
Regarding this, the behavioral literature in the area 
of accounting has overlooked information sharing 
when analyzing the effects of budgetary participation 
on managerial performance (Kyj & Parker, 2008; Zonatto, 
2014). The evidence found in the literature on the 
intervening effects on this relationship is underexplored, 
thus presenting a theoretical gap that encourages this 
study (Dani, Zonatto & Diehl, 2017). Similarly, little is 
known about these relationships in a specific sample 
of managers responsible for the controlling area, an 
important organizational unit that supports management 
(Palomino & Frezatti, 2016). Controlling carries out 
the function of transforming information so that it 
assists and facilitates decision-making in other areas 
of the organization (Siegel & Kulesza, 1996), playing 
an important role in the preparation of strategic and 
budgetary plans (Govindarajan & Anthony, 2001).
The evidence found for the relationship between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance 
has presented various results that indicate a direct (Kyj & 
Parker, 2008; Parker & Kyj, 2006; Zonatto et al., 2019) or 
indirect relationship between these variables, measured 
by other intervening variables (Baldvinsdottir, Mitchell 
& Norreklit, 2010; Dani et al., 2017; Derfuss, 2016), 
such as motivation (Chong et al., 2005; Karakoc & Ozer, 
2016; Mia, 1988), satisfaction (Kyj & Parker, 2008), and 
organizational commitment (Chong & Johnson, 2007; 
Parker & Kyj, 2006). These results reinforce the indications 
that the effects of participation on performance may not 
occur based on a simple causality relationship, but instead 
based on certain conditioning factors. 
It should also be considered that the results found in 
previous studies have diverged in relation to the effects 
of the relationship between budgetary participation 
and managerial performance (Dani et al. 2017; Derfuss, 
2016). There is evidence that reveals a positive relationship 
between budgetary participation and performance, such 
as in Lau and Lim (2002), Chong et al. (2005), Lau and 
Tan (2005), Agbejule and Saarikoski (2006), Chong 
and Johnson (2007), Zonatto and Lavarda (2013), and 
Zonatto et al. (2019). However, there are studies that 
have indicated a negative (Mia, 1988; Brownell, 1981) or 
even non-significant relationship between these variables 
(Dunk, 1989; Milani, 1975). 
In light of the above, the problem question that 
stimulates this study is: what are the mediating 
cognitive effects of vertical information sharing in the 
budgeting process on the relationship between budgetary 
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participation and managerial performance? Thus, the 
general objective established for the study is to answer 
this question.
The academic production related to budgetary 
participation may still be considered underdeveloped 
in Brazil (Dani et al., 2017; Lavarda & Almeida, 2013) 
and inconclusive (Dani et al., 2017), thus requiring 
new studies that preferentially focus on investigating 
the effect of intervening variables on this relationship 
(Derfuss, 2016), in order to better understand under what 
conditions participation results in better performance. 
Thus, this study presents important implications for 
the knowledge on the topic, since it provides evidence 
of the conditioning effects of the levels of information 
sharing on these relationships (participation and 
performance) and how this sharing is consequently 
reflected in information asymmetry, in role ambiguity, 
and in managerial performance.
This study makes a contribution for researchers 
interested in issues related to internal controls, budgeting, 
and behavioral accounting, given that the results may 
provide new evidence of the cognitive effects of the 
participation of individuals in budgeting processes. In 
addition, by demonstrating this to professionals who 
determine organizational structures and who establish 
the design of management control systems in companies, 
this study contributes to understanding their implications 
for the job performance of individuals. 
The results of this study support the evidence that 
budgetary participation directly and indirectly influences 
managerial performance. These conditions have favored 
information sharing, reducing role ambiguity and 
information asymmetry and improving managerial 
performance. They also provide indications of the 
cognitive effects of the vertical information sharing 
resulting from the informative roles of the budget. Thus, 
they support the evidence of the direct and indirect effects 
of the budget over the actions of individuals in this context, 
as well as indicating how its use can result in better budget 
forecasts, more involvement of these professionals in the 
work, and the obtainment of better performance at the 
managerial level.
In addition, as practical and social contributions 
of this study, by using organizations that operate in 
Brazil to reveal budget management practices and their 
effects on the cognitions of individuals with budgetary 
responsibilities in the work environment, it enables 
them to evaluate their current management practices, 
in order to establish skill-building and training courses 
that lead to these professionals achieving better managerial 
performance. The findings of this study also serve as a 
parameter for other organizations that have not been 
studied so that they can evaluate the adoption of budget 
management practices that contribute to minimizing 
the negative effects of information asymmetry and role 
ambiguity, with a view to obtaining better performance.
2. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS MODEL AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Given the research opportunity identified, this study 
seeks to understand the interactions present in the 
budgeting process from a wider theoretical perspective, 
emphasizing the intervening effects of information sharing. 
Thus, when analyzed in isolation, the existence of a possible 
direct and indirect association is recognized between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance. 
However, in the theoretical model elaborated, these effects 
are tested simultaneously with the other relationships that 
are the object of analysis, in order to be able to understand 
the drivers of performance.
It is therefore possible to infer whether budgetary 
participation has a direct and indirect effective influence 
on performance or whether this influence is determined 
by the conditions in which information sharing occurs. 
Consequently, the evidence produced based on these 
findings present important implications for the field of 
studies, since it may reveal the possible explanation for 
the inconsistent results found in some previous studies 
developed on the topic. Figure 1 presents the theoretical 
analysis model and the general overview of the hypotheses 
established for the investigation.
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Figure 1 Theoretical analysis model and general overview of the research hypotheses
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The direct effects of budgetary participation over the 
performance of subordinates have been the object of 
considerable investigations in the area of management 
accounting (Chong et al., 2005). The relationship between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance 
presents a much-debated question in the research 
developed from the behavioral perspective of accounting, 
but it is as yet unresolved. This occurs because its effects 
may not be perceived directly, but rather indirectly, 
through intervening variables (Dani et al., 2017; Derfuss, 
2016).
Ferris (1977) and Zonatto (2014) define managerial 
performance as the degree to which individuals obtain 
success when carrying out their work activities. For Mia 
and Patiar (2002), the concept of managerial performance 
consists of individuals successfully carrying out all their 
functions and attributions developed by during the 
management process. 
Studies have demonstrated that budgetary participation 
presents a positive effect on managerial performance 
through motivational and cognitive mechanisms 
(Covaleski et al., 2006; Kren, 1992; Parker & Kyj, 2006; 
Shields & Shields, 1998; Zonatto, 2014; Zonatto et al., 
2019). In addition, studies have shown that budgetary 
participation leads to better job performance, as 
subordinates understand that they are being treated as 
valuable partners in the decision-making process (Jermias 
& Yigit, 2012; Zonatto et al., 2019). 
Thus, in the first hypothesis tested in this investigation, 
it is assumed that a subordinate’s participation in the 
budgeting process increases the level of managerial 
performance, which indicates a positive relationship 
between these variables:
H1: budgetary participation is positively associated with managerial 
performance. 
However, considering the evidence presented in 
revisional studies developed by Derfuss (2016) and Dani 
et al. (2017), it is understood that when these relationships 
are investigated by observing, in the theoretical analysis 
model, the effect of other intervening variables present 
in the budgeting process, as in the case proposed in this 
investigation (Figure 1), it is acknowledged that such direct 
effects may not be identified. From this perspective, the 
alternative hypothesis presented to explain these results 
relates to the intervening cognitive effects of information 
sharing, which would be conditioning factors in achieving 
better performance.
Zoni and Kenneth (2007) highlight that greater 
levels of controller participation in both strategic and 
operational management processes are perceived when the 
participation is related with some organizational variables, 
such as capital intensity, interdependence between areas, 
financial manager competences, and formalization of 
strategic planning and of the budgeting process. 
The reason for an organization to have budgetary 
participation is information sharing between superiors and 
subordinates (Kyj & Parker, 2008; Shields & Shields, 1998). 
For Parker & Kyj (2006), vertical information sharing 
involves subordinates revealing private information to 
their superiors.
Shields and Young (1993) revealed that budgetary 
participation is most important for planning, control, 
and the sharing of information between subordinates 
and superiors, and there are reasons for the existence of 
a participative budgeting model. In these conditions, the 
budgetary participation of subordinates is expected to be 
able to positively influence vertical information sharing 
in the companies analyzed in this study.
According to Dunk (1993), with budgetary 
participation, managers and subordinates communicate 
more with each other, sharing information and thus 
developing budgetary goals more precisely, since they have 
better quality information. Parker and Kyj (2006) explain 
that a successful model for vertical information sharing 
in the budgeting process can improve the organization’s 
budgeting process. 
In their study, the authors identified a positive 
relationship between budgetary participation and vertical 
information sharing with senior management. Thus, in 
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H5- H7-
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the second hypothesis tested in this study, it is understood 
that budgetary participation can positively influence 
vertical information sharing.
H2: budgetary participation is positively associated with vertical 
information sharing.
One of the most important benefits of the budgeting 
process is information sharing between members of the 
organization (Hopwood, 1976). Information exchange 
between subordinates and superiors during budgetary 
discussions is especially important, with many possible 
benefits both for the individual and for the organization 
(Shields & Shields, 1998). Information sharing can 
increase individual performance, enabling superiors to 
help develop better strategies for subordinates (Murray, 
1990) and to ensure that they receive adequate budgetary 
support. 
Nouri and Parker (1998) highlight that the disclosure 
of private information held by subordinates can enable 
superiors help to develop better strategies in relation to 
budgets. The evidence found by Parker and Kyj (2006) 
suggests that vertical information sharing is positively 
associated with managerial performance. Thus, in this 
study it is believed that vertical information sharing 
is able to positively and significantly influence the job 
performance of individuals.
H3: vertical information sharing is positively associated with 
managerial performance.
Chong et al. (2005) highlight that budgetary 
participation presents subordinates with the opportunity to 
share, clarify, and discuss information on the organization 
with their superiors. Thus, greater participation by the 
individual in the budgeting process reduces role ambiguity 
(Chenhall & Brownell, 1988; Jackson & Schuler, 1985; 
Zonatto et al., 2019). Parker and Kyj (2006) tested the effects 
of vertical information sharing, analyzing the quality of 
the communication carried out in organizations. Previous 
studies suggest links between budgetary participation, 
role ambiguity, and managerial performance. However, 
this relationship may be mediated by information sharing 
(Parker & Kyj, 2006).
Thus, to carry out this research, it is understood 
that individuals are likely to present less resistance to 
change, a reduction in anxiety, and better comprehension 
of the activities to be carried out in the organization 
when information sharing occurs. Therefore, the fourth 
hypothesis establishes that:
H4: vertical information sharing is negatively associated with 
role ambiguity.
Vertical information sharing can also facilitate 
employee loyalty and trust in the organization’s 
management, promoting cooperation and flexibility 
at all management levels (Mia & Patiar, 2002), which 
may consequently contribute to reducing information 
asymmetry between superiors and subordinates. Clarkson, 
Jacobsen, and Batcheller (2007) suggested that information 
sharing is needed in an organization so that information 
asymmetry problems are resolved and greater awareness 
of the information is produced.
Despite some authors suggesting that budgetary 
participation can smooth out asymmetry levels in an 
organization, this does not always occur (Lavarda & 
Almeida, 2013), which suggests that there are other 
conditioning factors in the environment that are capable 
of interfering in this relationship. Information asymmetry 
is the result of information sharing (Clarkson et al., 2007). 
Thus, it is related to an individual’s propensity to be willing 
to share information that he/she has, and this propensity 
is a determinant of the consequent effects of information 
sharing on the organizational environment, such as a 
reduction (or not) in asymmetry levels and the obtainment 
(or not) of better managerial performance.
Regarding this, Shields and Young (1993) and 
Lavarda and Almeida (2013) demonstrated that even 
in an environment with high manager participation 
in budgeting processes, they may experience a lack of 
information sharing regarding the activities carried out 
between management levels. In this context, to carry 
out this research, it follows that information sharing 
contributes to an improvement in communication 
between the different management levels (Baiman & 
Lewis, 1989). Therefore, it is assumed that information 
sharing is negatively related with information asymmetry.
H5: vertical information sharing is negatively associated with 
information asymmetry.
Chenhall and Brownell (1988) revealed that budgetary 
participation can provide information for reducing 
role ambiguity, and has contributed to improving 
the performance of subordinates (Chong et al., 2005; 
Kren, 1992). For Santos, Anzilago, and Lunkes (2017), 
the cognition of individuals can influence managerial 
performance.
It is believed that these events occur when there is a 
propensity for the individuals to share their information. 
Dunk (1993), Beuren, Roth, and Anzilago (2017), and 
Zonatto et al. (2019) identified a negative relationship 
between role ambiguity and the managerial performance 
of subordinates in the workplace. Therefore, it is believed 
that, in conditions of greater budgetary participation and 
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greater vertical information sharing, role ambiguity presents 
a negative relationship with managerial performance. The 
sixth research hypothesis was thus established.
H6: role ambiguity is negatively associated with managerial 
performance.
Information asymmetry and managerial performance 
have been the focus of debates in the area of management, 
as subordinates revealing private information to superiors 
results in more precise budgets, which consequently 
positively affects managerial performance (Magner, 
Welker & Campbell, 1996). From this perspective, 
a reduction in information asymmetry levels aims to 
improve the job performance of individuals (Clarkson 
et al. 2007; Zonatto & Lavarda, 2013).
However, there is evidence that information asymmetry 
may also be positively related with performance. The 
study developed by Mia and Patiar (2002) revealed a 
positive relationship between information asymmetry and 
managerial performance. When information asymmetry is 
present, budgetary slack can be created and subsequently 
used to achieve better managerial performance (Covaleski 
et al., 2006; Kren, 1992), which would explain such results.
Thus, to carry out this study, it is understood that, 
in conditions of greater vertical information sharing, 
the relationship to be identified between information 
asymmetry and managerial performance tends to be 
negative, given that the informative roles of the budget 
favor communication, inhibit the creation of slack, 
and create conditions for the establishment of a more 
adequate budget plan, considering the budgetary needs 
of the organization and its different divisional unit 
managers. Therefore, the seventh research hypothesis 
establishes that:
H7: information asymmetry is negatively associated with 
managerial performance.
As can be verified based on the theoretical analysis 
model proposed for this investigation (Figure 1), it is 
understood that participation in itself is not enough to 
explain managerial performance, due to the existence of 
other variables in the budgeting process that interact and 
determine the conditions in which such influences occur. 
Thus, evidence is sought of a factor that conditions the 
obtainment of better managerial performance, observing 
the antecedent effects of the budgetary configuration 
adopted by the organization (participative or not), of the 
intervening variable vertical information sharing, and its 
consequent effects that are able to influence information 
asymmetry, role ambiguity, and performance. 
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
The methodology adopted in this investigation 
is characterized as descriptive research, and it uses a 
survey for the data collection process and a quantitative 
approach for the data analysis. The study is characterized 
as descriptive, due to it presenting a description and 
analysis of cognitive effects of the participation of 
controllers, controlling managers, and controlling 
coordinators on budgeting processes. These effects are 
observed via vertical information sharing, role ambiguity, 
and information asymmetry. The study evaluates a model 
of vertical information sharing between superiors and 
subordinates in the budgeting process, where controllers, 
controlling managers, and controlling coordinators are 
the subordinates and their superiors are the executives 
responsible for the organizations. 
The population of this research was defined based 
on an identification of the companies operating in the 
country that have managers with controller, controlling 
manager, and controlling coordinator functions. To define 
the sample to be investigated in the study, with the help 
of groups on LinkedIn, individuals in the country with 
budgetary responsibilities who carry out these functions 
were contacted. 
This population was chosen due to controllers 
assuming different positions in different companies, 
which makes them a strategic element in organizations, 
since they are the professionals with excellence in the 
information generated in organizations (Palomino & 
Frezatti, 2016). The management function is one of the 
competences or functions that belongs to the controlling 
area and is among controllers’ responsibilities (Palomino 
& Frezatti, 2016). With regards to their participation 
in the budgeting process, Anthony and Govindarajan 
(2008) argue that controllers are responsible for functions 
that include preparing strategic and budgeting plans, 
installing and operationalizing budgeting programs and 
systems, as well as analyzing forecasted and executed 
budgets. However, controllers are also responsible for 
their budgeting units, which is a context investigated in 
this study, in which these professionals are answerable 
for the budget of their divisional units and not regarding 
the organizational budget.
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After identifying the population that is the object of 
study, an invitation was initially sent via the LinkedIn 
business network to professionals registered there. 
This procedure was carried out in the period between 
November of 2016 and March of 2017. After an acceptance 
was received from the professional, the second data 
collection phase was begun, which consisted of sending 
the link to the questionnaire elaborated on Google Docs. 
A total of 1,985 invitations were sent and, of these, 852 
agreed to answer the research instrument.
The sample analyzed is characterized as non-
probabilistic, intentional, and obtained by accessibility, 
and it involved the participation of 316 controllers 
from different organizations based in the country. Non-
probabilistic samples are not necessarily chosen in order to 
be statistically representative of the population (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2009). In an intentional sample, 
the researcher determines the elements and locations that 
he/she will investigate, since it is through these that he/she 
will understand the research problem (Creswell & Clark, 
2007). The research instrument adopted to collect the data 
was developed with objective questions, contemplating 
the variables analyzed in the study. Table 1 presents the 
variables used and their operational definitions.
Table 1 
Constructs and operational definitions
Variables Operational definitions Scale Authors
Budgetary 
participation (BP)
Evaluates the individual’s influence on the budgeting 
process.
Six indicators
7-point Likert
Milani (1975)
Vertical information 
sharing (IS)
Determines the degree to which subordinates 
communicate information about local conditions to 
their superiors.
Three indicators
7-point Likert
Parker and Kyj (2006)
Role ambiguity (RA)*
Describes the lack of clarity of expectations in 
relation to job roles and the level of uncertainty 
regarding the results of the performance itself.
Six indicators
7-point Likert
Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman (1970)
Information 
asymmetry (IA)*
Determines the degree to which a superior has more 
information than the subordinate regarding the 
subordinate’s area of responsibility.
Six indicators
7-point Likert
Dunk (1993)
Managerial 
performance (MP)
Evaluates the performance measure of managers with 
budgeting responsibilities in their work activities.
Nine indicators
7-point Likert
Mahoney, Jerde, and Carroll (1963, 
1965, cited by Zonatto, 2014)
* = question with reverse scale.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
First, the instruments to be used for the data collection 
were translated and checked by professors specialized 
in languages from the language department of the 
university the researchers work at. In this stage of the 
research, a comparison was also made between these 
translated instruments and those used in other studies 
already conducted in Brazil that used such instruments. 
Next, the adapted instrument was analyzed by a research 
professor from the managerial area of accounting, a doctor 
in accounting sciences and expert in this subject, to verify 
the translation and suggest adaptations that might be 
needed to capture the key concepts investigated in the 
study. After this evaluation, no new adjustments were 
made, and so we proceeded to carry out the pre-test.
In this study, the pre-test was carried out by 
applying the research instrument sent via email to PhD 
students with experience in the controlling area of the 
post-graduate program in accounting sciences of the 
university the researchers work at, thus constituting the 
pre-test participants. First, the purpose of the pre-test was 
explained to the invited students and they were asked to 
participate and collaborate in evaluating each item of the 
proposed data collection instrument. 
At the end of the pre-test, the suggestions for 
improvements in the collection instrument were identified 
to clarify some terms that might not be understood by the 
participants in the research. However, no questions were 
identified that the students did not understand. Having 
obtained the final version of the research instrument, the 
professionals were invited to answer the questionnaire, 
inferring its clarity, which was confirmed, and so we 
began the data collection stage.
Since the level of analysis in this investigation focuses 
on individuals, based on the definition of the minimum 
number of participants in the study, we adopted the use 
of structural equations modeling (SEM) to evaluate the 
theoretical relationships observed. Hair et al. (2009) state 
that in order to use structural equations five respondents are 
needed per indicator analyzed in the model. That minimum 
number of respondents was observed in this study.
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After carrying out the data collection, these were 
tabulated in electronic spreadsheets imported for statistical 
treatment using the SPSS and AMOS software packages. 
First, a frequency analysis of the data collected in the 
study was carried out. This stage of the analysis involved 
descriptive statistics, identifying the theoretical interval 
(scale used) followed by the real interval (maximum 
and minimum), mean, and standard deviation. Next, we 
carried out the exploratory factor analysis of the constructs 
investigated. The criteria used for the exploratory factor 
analysis of the constructs were: Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70, 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) > 0.50, Bartlett’s sphericity 
test p < 0.05, factor loads of the indicators > 0.35, and 
commonalities > 0.60, as recommended by Hair et al. 
(2009), considering the size of the sample.
After carrying out the exploratory analysis, we 
proceeded to the confirmatory factor analysis of the 
constructs investigated in the study. As Hair et al. (2009) 
explain, in a confirmatory data analysis test, the researcher 
should demonstrate the number of factors that exist in 
a set of variables and over what factor each variable will 
highly load before the results can be calculated. This 
type of analysis is suitable for using SEM. To carry out 
the confirmatory factor analysis and evaluation of the 
relationships investigated in the study via SEM, the 
AMOS® 19.0 software was used. The criteria adopted to 
make inferences about the validation of the measurements 
models and the relationships investigated are presented 
in Table 2.
Table 2 
Criteria used to evaluate the fit of the measurement constructs based on the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
Indicator Recommended value Reference Expected value
Chi-squared/DF < 5
Hair et al. 
(2009)
< 5
Statistical significance (p) < 0.05 < 0.05
CFI
< 0 and < 1
(the closer to 1 the better)
> 0.90
TLI > 0.90
NFI > 0.90
GFI Jöreskog and Sörbom 
(1989)
> 0.90
AGFI > 0.90
RMSEA < 0.10
Hair et al. 
(2009)
< 0.10
Cronbach’s alpha (construct) > 0.70 > 0.70
Factor loads (indicators) > 0.40 > 0.40
Composite reliability > 0.50 > 0.50
Extracted validity > 0.50 > 0.50
AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; DF = degree of freedom; NFI = 
normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index.
Source: Adapted from Zonatto (2014).
Next, the control variables that may affect the 
relationships tested in the study were inserted, such 
as control (national/multinational), capital (open/
closed), and, when industry, size (turnover), number of 
employees, and time the company has existed. Possible 
effects related to the characteristics of the company and 
of the individuals may significantly influence budgetary 
participation and, consequently, information sharing. 
It was noted whether the company operates in different 
countries, as such companies may have a different policy 
for their management processes and relations with their 
subordinates (Lavarda & Almeida, 2013).
To infer the theoretical validity and fit of the 
measurement constructs, as well as in relation to the 
goodness-of-fit of the structural model tested and the 
significance of the theoretical relationships investigated in 
this study, we analyzed the set of indicators presented in 
Table 2. A summary of the results found is presented below.
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4. PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS
This study comprised 316 controllers, controlling 
managers, and controlling coordinators from different 
organizations. Of these, 119 are multinational firms 
and 197 are national ones; 54 are open capital and 262 
are closed capital. The companies that compose the 
sample analyzed can be divided into three economic 
activities. Industry corresponded to 45.57% of the sample 
analyzed. Commerce corresponded to 18.35%. In turn, 
those classified as service providers cover 30.38% of the 
sample analyzed. With relation to the classification of 
these companies, as established by the National Bank 
for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), it was 
verified that all the size categories were covered in the 
study. There was a perceived predominance (62.66%) of 
companies that presented an annual turnover greater 
than 40 million reais.
Considering the time these companies have been 
operating, it was verified that 51.58% have been in 
existence for 10 to 50 years, 26.90% for more than 50 
years, and 21.52% for up to 10 years. With relation 
to the number of employees, 219 companies from 
the sample have up to 1,000 employees. Of the rest, 
62 have up to 10 thousand employees and 35 firms 
have more than 10 thousand. With relation to the 
description of the position in the organizations in 
which the professionals work, “controller” is the term 
that covered the greatest number of respondents in 
the study, totaling 237 respondents. The position title 
“controlling coordinator” presented 40 respondents. 
In turn, the position of “controlling manager” had 39 
respondents, which represents 12.34% of the sample 
analyzed.
Table 3 presents a summary of the results of the 
descriptive statistics analysis and the exploratory factor 
analysis of the theoretical construct elaborated for the 
study.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and exploratory factor analysis of the constructs analyzed in the study
Var. CA KMO BST TVE% Ind. TI RI Mean SD AS KT FL Com.
BP 0.85 0.835 865.2 60.0
BP01 1-7 1-7 6.49 1.07 -2.78 8.71 0.81 0.66
BP02 1-7 1-7 5.75 1.43 -1.20 1.05 0.61 0.37
BP03 1-7 1-7 6.44 0.99 -2.50 7.92 0.79 0.63
BP04 1-7 1-7 6.10 1.24 -1.72 3.20 0.80 0.64
BP05 1-7 1-7 6.42 0.97 -2.58 8.91 0.83 0.69
BP06 1-7 1-7 5.97 1.31 -1.63 2.63 0.76 0.58
MP 0.88 0.893 1315 53.8
MP01 1-7 1-7 5.92 0.93 -1.04 2.03 0.70 0.49
MP02 1-7 1-7 5.93 0.95 -1.20 3.049 0.75 0.56
MP03 1-7 3-7 6.02 0.91 -0.68 -0.21 0.67 0.46
MP04 1-7 2-7 5.75 1.00 -0.63 0.07 0.81 0.66
MP05 1-7 1-7 6.08 0.97 -1.31 2.48 0.77 0.60
MP06 1-7 1-7 5.84 1.07 -1.19 2.22 0.80 0.64
MP07 1-7 1-7 5.61 1.17 -1.05 1.59 0.68 0.46
MP08 1-7 1-7 5.29 1.42 -0.81 0.31 0.71 0.50
MP09 1-7 4-7 5.89 0.74 -0.42 0.11 0.66 0.44
IS 0.84 0.71 437.2 77.3
IS01 1-7 1-7 6.09 1.13 -1.88 4.57 0.89 0.80
IS02 1-7 1-7 6.20 1.09 -2.22 6.40 0.90 0.81
IS03 1-7 1-7 5.69 1.37 -1.36 1.80 0.83 0.69
RA 0.81 0.826 648.1 53.5
RA01 1-7 1-7 6.37 0.91 -2.05 5.94 0.57 0.33
RA02 1-7 1-7 5.89 1.37 -1.60 2.54 0.73 0.53
RA03 1-7 1-7 5.33 1.50 -0.83 1.17 0.64 0.42
RA04 1-7 1-7 6.47 0.88 -2.39 7.88 0.76 0.58
RA05 1-7 1-7 5.85 1.31 -1.28 1.50 0.84 0.71
RA06 1-7 1-7 5.44 1.54 -0.88 0.05 0.79 0.62
Micheli Aparecida Lunardi, Vinícius Costa da Silva Zonatto & Juliana Constâncio Nascimento
23R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 82, p. 14-32, jan./abr. 2020
Var. CA KMO BST TVE% Ind. TI RI Mean SD AS KT FL Com.
IA 0.95 0.892 1998.8 81.3
IA01 1-7 1-7 3.82 1.98 0.05 -1.25 0.88 0.79
IA02 1-7 1-7 3.76 1.94 0.06 -1.20 0.91 0.83
IA03 1-7 1-7 3.85 1.88 -0.01 -1.08 0.91 0.83
IA04 1-7 1-7 3.49 1.88 0.20 -1.14 0.90 0.82
IA05 1-7 1-7 3.92 1.81 -0.04 -0.94 0.88 0.78
IA06 1-7 1-7 3.77 1.82 0.03 -1.04 0.90 0.81
CA = Cronbach’s alpha; IA = information asymmetry; RA = role ambiguity; AS = asymmetry; FL = factor load; IS = vertical 
information sharing; Com. = commonalities; KT = kurtosis; MP = managerial performance; SD = standard deviation; Ind. = 
indicator; RI = real interval; TI = theoretical interval; BP = budgetary participation; BST = Bartlett’s sphericity test; Var. = variable; 
TVE = total variance explained. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In Table 3, it is verified that the indicators of the 
exploratory factor analysis reached the values determined 
by the literature in all the constructs analyzed in the 
research. Thus, the relationship between the groups of 
variables analyzed is perceived. In addition, it is found 
that all the indicators of the constructs analyzed presented 
an appropriate factor load to keep in the constructs 
evaluated in the study. The results found in this stage of 
the research indicate minimum and maximum answers 
in all the constructs analyzed, which reveals minimum 
and maximum levels of agreement and disagreement for 
these questions.
These findings reveal that the budgetary configuration 
of the organizations the respondents work in is different, 
with there being companies that adopt a participative 
configuration and others that do not. Not all the controllers, 
controlling managers, and controlling coordinators 
perceive their influence in the budgeting processes of 
their organizations. Similarly, it is perceived that not all 
report the occurrence of vertical information sharing in 
their companies. The evidence found also reveals that 
role ambiguity is perceived in some organizations, as 
well as information asymmetry between some superiors 
and subordinates.
These findings reinforce the opportunity to carry 
out this study, since having found these differences it 
becomes possible to evaluate their effects on the theoretical 
relationships investigated in the study, which may indicate 
how these interactions affect the influence of participation 
on performance. According to Shields and Shields (1998), 
budgetary participation influences organizational results, 
as well as the performance of subordinates. However, the 
evidence presented by Chong et al. (2005) and Zonatto 
(2014) reveal that this may not occur directly. Thus, there 
are conditioning factors of budgetary participation that 
explain its influence on performance at the managerial 
level.
As the data analyzed were obtained based on data 
collection, where the information on the exogenous and 
endogenous variables was obtained from the same source 
(the same respondent), the Harman test (one factor test) 
was carried out to verify the occurrence of common 
method bias, as recommended by Bido, Montovani, 
and Cohen (2018). The results found indicated that 
the constructs analyzed together generated five factors, 
where the first explains only 28.40% of the total variance 
explained, which suggests the non-existence of common 
method bias.
Thus, seeking to evaluate these relationships, we 
proceeded to analyze the results based on the SEM. Table 
4 presents the results of the fit indices of the structural 
models tested in the study, where the first of the initial 
model is proposed for the investigation (Figure 1) and the 
second of the initial model is purified, containing only 
the results of the significant relationships for the sample 
analyzed in the study.
Table 3
Cont.
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Table 4 
Indices of the measurement model
Indicator Expected value Initial model Purified final model
Chi-squared 925.990 595.490
DF 370 226
Chi-squared/DF < 5 2.503 2.635
Statistical significance (p) < 0.05 0.000 0.000
CFI > 0.90 0.903 0.900
TLI > 0.90 0.894 0.888
NFI > 0.90 0.850 0.850
GFI > 0.90 0.826 0.856
AGFI > 0.90 0.796 0.824
RMSEA < 0.10 0.069 0.072
AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; DF = degree of freedom; NFI = 
normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the initial 
measurement model elaborated for the analysis of the 
influence of the cognitive effects of vertical information 
sharing in the budgeting process over information 
asymmetry, role ambiguity, and managerial performance 
presented acceptable values, close to those expected, which 
suggests the validity of the structural measurement model. 
The same is observed in relation to the purified final 
model. The fit index of both models presented a degree 
of freedom (DF) of 2, significant at p < 0.000, and a root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of 0.075.
According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 
(1992), there is no single statistical test that best describes 
predictions of a model. Despite there being no specific 
guidelines for evaluating the fit of a model, the higher 
the values of the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), normed 
fit index (NFI), and adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), 
the better the general fit of the model; however, other 
indicators can be evaluated. When the RMSEA presents 
a value lower than 0.10, the analysis model is considered 
acceptable. In addition, a non-significant chi-squared 
value is another indication of the acceptable fit of the 
model (Riordan & Griffeth, 1995).
In the first theoretical analysis model, it was verified 
that the path that evaluates the direct effects of budgetary 
participation on managerial performance did not present 
statistically significant values. The same was observed 
in relation to the paths that evaluate the relationships 
between information sharing and asymmetry and 
between information asymmetry and performance. 
Thus, in the purified model, we proceeded to analyze 
these relationships, initially excluding each one of these 
paths, so that it was possible to infer how the interactions 
occur between the theoretical variables that are the object 
of analysis in this study, which are presented in Figure 
1. The results found for each one of the tests carried 
out confirmed the non-statistical significance of these 
relationships. Figure 2 reveals the final results of the 
path estimates of the purified measurement model used 
to investigate these relationships.
Figure 2 Path estimates in the purified structural model
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
 
 
 
 
H4- H6-
 -0.51*  -0.21*
H2+ H3+
0.76* 0.50*
Role ambiguity
Budget participation Vertical information sharing
Managerial 
performance
Micheli Aparecida Lunardi, Vinícius Costa da Silva Zonatto & Juliana Constâncio Nascimento
25R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 82, p. 14-32, jan./abr. 2020
From the results presented in Figure 2, it is observed 
that budgetary participation enhances information sharing, 
resulting in better managerial performance. Similarly, it 
is perceived that in conditions of greater levels of vertical 
information sharing, role ambiguity is reduced, which 
results in better performance. Therefore, it can be verified 
that information sharing constitutes a conditioning variable 
in the obtainment of better managerial performance.
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The standardized coefficients and the significances of the relationships of this model are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 
Standardized coefficients and significances of the relationships of the models tested
Results of the initial model
Structural paths Estimate
Standard 
error
t-value ρ Standardized 
coefficient
R2
IS ← BP 0.868 0.072 12.101 * 0.761 0.579
IA ← IS 0.153 0.109 1.404 0.160 0.086 0.007
RA ← IS -0.468 0.064 -7.315 * -0.513 0.263
MP ← IS 0.386 0.072 5.368 * 0.605 0.424
MP ← IA -0.034 0.018 -1.897 0.058 -0.095 0.424
MP ← RA -0.150 0.047 -3.198 0.001 -0.215 0.424
MP ← BP -0.091 0.069 -1.326 0.185 -0.125 0.424
Results of the purified final model
IS ← BP 0.865 0.072 12.061 * 0.756 0.571
RA ← IS -0.464 0.064 -7.293 * -0.511 0.261
MP ← IS 0.314 0.046 6.796 * 0.496 0.397
MP ← RA -0.147 0.047 -3.132 0.002 -0.210 0.397
IA = information asymmetry; RA = role ambiguity; IS = vertical information sharing; MP = managerial performance; BP = 
budgetary participation. 
* = Standard error
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In Table 5, it is observed that the relationships 
between information sharing ← budgetary participation, 
role ambiguity ← information sharing, and managerial 
performance ← information sharing were significant at 
0.01. The relationship between managerial performance 
← role ambiguity was also significant, however at the 0.05 
level. These results reveal that, for these cases, the t-values 
were higher than the values recommended by Hair et 
al. (2009), which indicates the existence of statistically 
significant relationships between the constructs, which 
did not occur in the other relationships investigated 
(information asymmetry ← information sharing and 
managerial performance ← information asymmetry).
It is also verified in Table 5 that the path of the 
measurement model that investigates the direct effects of 
budgetary participation on managerial performance does 
not reveal a significant relationship (λ = -0.125) between 
these variables. Thus, it is not possible to affirm that the 
participation of individuals in the budgeting process alone 
will significantly influence their job performance, thus not 
supporting the first research hypothesis (H1: budgetary 
participation is positively associated with managerial 
performance).
Similar results have been identified by various studies 
such as Brownell (1982, 1983), Kren (1992), Shields and 
Young (1993), Nouri and Parker (1998), Lau and Tan (1998; 
2005), Lau and Lim (2002), Chong et al. (2005), Agbejule 
and Saarikoski (2006), and Chong and Johnson (2007). 
Budgetary participation motivates and helps subordinates 
in their job performance (Jermias & Yigit, 2012). However, 
its effects may not occur directly, but through other 
intervening variables (Dani et al., 2017; Zonatto et al., 
2019). Thus, budgetary participation enables the definition 
of clearer goals and objectives, as well as the elaboration 
of better forecasts, which contributes to the organization 
achieving better performance; however, this situation 
occurs via the influence of intervening variables that act 
as conditioning factors, such as information sharing.
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With regards to this, it is verified that budgetary 
participation influences vertical information sharing 
λ = 0.761, explaining 57.90% of this variable (R² 0.579). 
Thus, based on the results found, it is possible to affirm 
that the budgetary participation of the individuals 
participating in the study influences information sharing 
in the organizations, which confirms the second research 
hypothesis (H2: budgetary participation is positively 
associated with vertical information sharing).
These results reveal that, in conditions of higher levels 
of budgetary participation, in which the individuals 
participating in the budgeting process perceive their 
influence in this process, information sharing between 
managers is more likely to occur, which improves the 
management process and tends to positively influence 
their performance. Therefore, participation enables 
subordinates to present private information to their 
superiors, which contributes to drawing up better budgets, 
making better decisions, and achieving better managerial 
performance (Chong et al., 2005; Chong & Johnson, 2007; 
Covaleski et al., 2006; Derfuss, 2016; Magner et al., 1996; 
Nouri & Parker, 1998; Shields & Shields, 1998; Zonatto 
& Lavarda, 2013). 
The results of this research are corroborated by the 
studies from Shields and Young (1993), Shields and Shields 
(1998), and Parker and Kyj (2006), which demonstrated 
that budgetary participation has a relationship with 
information sharing between subordinates and superiors. 
Participation in the budget provides subordinates with 
opportunities to share their perceptions with their 
superiors, thus increasing the probability of subordinates 
communicating private information to their superiors 
(Covaleski et al., 2006; Parker & Kyj, 2006). However, 
Jermias and Setiawan (2008) highlight that superiors 
often do not share information with their subordinates, 
as they fear that they will manipulate and misinterpret 
the information.
Budgetary participation and vertical information 
sharing have presented similar results (Parker & Kyj, 
2006) that indicate a positive association between these 
variables. According to Shields and Young (1993), 
budgetary participation is important for planning, 
control, and information sharing between subordinates 
and superiors, and there are reasons for the existence of 
budgetary participation in organizations.
However, it has to be considered that participation 
alone is not enough to make information sharing 
viable, this being determined by elements anteceding 
the participation of individuals in the budgeting process 
or present in that process that may act as facilitators or 
inhibitors of sharing. Thus, considering their relevance, 
one research opportunity that emerges from these findings 
involves analyzing the conditioning factors of information 
sharing in the budgeting process.
Analyzing the influence of the cognitive effects 
of information sharing in the budgeting process, it is 
possible to prove or refute, using the empirical evidence 
found in this study, the relationships presented in the 
literature that have suggested some influence between the 
variables of the constructs analyzed. In this study, it was 
verified that vertical information sharing has an influence 
on managerial performance (λ = 0.496), providing an 
explanatory benchmark for this relationship of R² 0.397. 
Thus, it can be inferred that vertical information sharing 
will influence the managerial performance of these 
individuals, which proves the third research hypothesis 
(H3: vertical information sharing is positively associated 
with managerial performance).
Despite this evidence suggesting that budgetary 
participation results in greater vertical information 
sharing, the findings provide indications that the effects 
of participation over performance do not occur directly 
in this measurement model. These effects are mediated 
by vertical information sharing, which reinforces the 
informative roles of the budget, a cognitive element 
that constitutes an important intervening variable for 
understanding the conditions in which greater budgetary 
participation results in better managerial performance.
Disclosure of private information can enable superiors 
to develop better strategies in relation to budgets, and 
information sharing can also ensure subordinates receive 
adequate budgeting support (Murray, 1990; Nouri & 
Parker, 1998), which will be reflected in managerial 
performance. This positive relationship shows that 
information sharing between superiors and subordinates 
facilitates employee loyalty and trust in the organization’s 
management, thus promoting greater cooperation and 
flexibility at all management levels (Mia & Patiar, 2002).
Vertical information sharing also has an influence over 
role ambiguity (λ = -0.551 and R² 0.261), which indicates 
that, in conditions of greater budgetary participation, there 
is the occurrence of greater levels of information sharing, 
resulting in lower levels of perceived ambiguity. Therefore, 
it can be affirmed that vertical information sharing is 
negatively related to role ambiguity, thus supporting the 
fourth hypothesis investigated in the research (H4: vertical 
information sharing is negatively associated with role 
ambiguity).
The evidence found in this study suggests that vertical 
information sharing minimized possible negative effects 
of role ambiguity over managerial performance, which 
reinforces the informative roles of the budget. The findings 
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of this study coverage with the findings of Parker and Kyj 
(2006), who identified a negative relationship between 
role ambiguity and vertical information sharing. This 
occurs because subordinates who have clear information 
about their activities in the organization present low role 
ambiguity due to understanding the activities under their 
responsibility.
Disclosure of private information can enable 
superiors, together with their subordinates, to develop 
better strategies in relation to the organization’s budgets 
(Murray, 1990). Information sharing can also ensure that 
subordinates receive adequate budgeting support (Nouri 
& Parker, 1998), which to some extent will be reflected 
in the performance of the managers with budgeting 
responsibilities. 
Similarly, the opportunity to share information provides 
room for adjusting budget forecasts, by adapting resources 
and (re)defining goals and objectives to be achieved. 
Thus, it is possible to infer that, in these circumstances, 
managers with budgeting responsibilities have better 
conditions for achieving the desired performance, since 
they have an information set that allows them to define 
how best to proceed in order to achieve these established 
goals, objectives, and results. 
With regards to the influence of vertical information 
sharing over information asymmetry, it was found that 
λ = 0.086 and R² 0.007; thus, this relationship is not 
significant. This result therefore refutes the fifth hypothesis 
analyzed in the research (H5: vertical information sharing 
is negatively associated with information asymmetry).
With relation to role ambiguity and managerial 
performance, it was perceived that the former has an 
influence over managerial performance (λ = -0.210 
and R² 0.397). It was verified that the cognitive effect 
of information sharing was reflected in the negative 
relationship between role ambiguity and managerial 
performance, which enables the sixth hypothesis 
elaborated for this investigation to be accepted (H6: 
role ambiguity is negatively associated with managerial 
performance).
These results suggest that, in conditions of greater 
vertical information sharing, less role ambiguity occurs and, 
consequently, it is possible to observe better managerial 
performance. These findings reveal the conditioning 
role of information sharing in the relationship between 
budgetary participation and role ambiguity and between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance, 
a result that may explain the inconsistencies found in 
some previous studies for analyzing these relationships. 
Since this variable is a determinant for explaining the 
effects of participation, it can help in understanding 
how participation will directly or indirectly influence 
performance. Thus, it needs to be observed and evaluated 
when analyzing these relationships.
According to Chenhall and Brownell (1988), this 
occurs when budgetary participation provides enough 
information that can be capable of reducing the role 
ambiguity of subordinates, which, to some extent, will 
contribute to improving the managerial performance of 
the subordinates (Kren, 1992). Dunk (1993) and Zonatto 
et al. (2019) revealed the negative relationship between 
the role ambiguity and managerial performance of 
subordinates. Palomino and Frezatti (2016) demonstrate 
that Brazilian controllers perceive role conflict and 
ambiguity, but nonetheless present moderate levels of 
satisfaction. In this case, even with the perception of 
information asymmetry or role ambiguity, information 
sharing may be capable of positively influencing the job 
performance of these managers, minimizing to negative 
effects of these variables.
With relation to the influence of information 
asymmetry over managerial performance, no significant 
relationship was identified between these variables at the 
5% level, thus refuting the seventh research hypothesis 
(H7: information asymmetry is negatively associated with 
managerial performance). However, the results found 
are significant at a p-value of 0.10 (p > 0.07), and the 
relationship is negative between these variables analyzed in 
the study. Thus, it is possible to infer that individuals with 
better performance reported lower levels of information 
asymmetry in their organizations.
Studies such as Baiman and Evans (1983) and Zonatto 
and Lavarda (2013) have suggested that budgetary 
participation enables subordinates to have access to 
information that is relevant for carrying out their tasks, 
which would reduce information asymmetry and positively 
influence their job performance. Information sharing 
between superiors and subordinates facilitates employee 
loyalty and trust in the organization’s management, 
promoting more cooperation and flexibility at all 
management levels (Mia & Patiar, 2002). Consequently, 
in these conditions, it is possible to reduce information 
asymmetry between superiors and subordinates and its 
negative effects on performance.
In summary, based on the analysis of the influence of 
the factors investigated in this research, it can be inferred 
that budgetary participation would positively influence the 
managerial performance of individuals in the budgetary 
context, but indirectly, mediated by the intervening effects 
of information sharing. These findings demonstrate 
that the greater the participation of individuals in the 
budgets of the organizations they work in, the greater 
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the vertical information sharing tends to be, resulting in 
better managerial performance and in lower levels of role 
ambiguity and information asymmetry.
The findings of this study revealed that most of the 
managers participating in the research are strongly 
involved with the elaboration of the budget, have influence, 
and actively make contributions in their unit’s budgeting 
process, receiving and providing information. In these 
conditions, these professionals are able to present high 
managerial performance in the organizations they work 
in. This occurs because, based on this participation, 
better adjustments of the objectives and assumptions 
for allocating resources become possible, which improves 
the budget forecasts made, providing the organizations 
with more realistic and adequate forecasts. For Magner 
et al. (1996), it is subordinates with responsibilities that 
have privileged information about their business units. 
Thus, as they have intimate knowledge of their own work, 
they are better able to estimate the workload, the demand 
for resources, as well as the conditions needed to achieve 
the objectives determined by the organization.
Despite this evidence, the results found also revealed 
that the budgetary configuration of the organizations in 
which these professional work is distinct, which results 
in distinct effects on their performance. It was verified 
that there are managers who participate ceremonially in 
the budgeting processes, and do not have a significant 
influence over these processes. Similarly, as identified in 
other studies, the Brazilian controllers also reported the 
existence of role ambiguity (Palomino & Frezatti, 2016), 
as well as information asymmetry (Lavarda & Almeida, 
2013), in their organizations. In these cases, based on 
the descriptive analysis of the data, it was possible to 
identify that these results are also associated with lower 
levels of information sharing and worse managerial 
performance.
In general, the analyses carried out in this research 
demonstrate that information sharing constitutes a 
determinant variable in order to be able to observe 
the cognitive effects of budgetary participation on 
performance. The findings of this study indicate that, 
in Brazil, the greater the participation of individuals in 
the budgeting processes of organizations, the greater 
the vertical information sharing between superiors and 
subordinates and the greater their managerial performance 
tend to be.
Finally, in a new regression model, we sought to 
evaluate whether the characterization variables are capable 
of explaining the results found in this research. Table 6 
presents a summary of the results found for this analysis.
Table 6
Results of the additional analysis 
Variables BP IS RA IA MP
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
va
ri
ab
le
s
Control (national/multinational)
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
0.026 0.189* 0.029 -0.001 0.039
Capital (open/closed) -0.134* -0.001 -0.135* -0.082 -0.003
Industry 0.098 0.149* 0.029 -0.075 0.082
Size (turnover) -0.013 -0.036 -0.099 0.023 -0.025
Nº of employees 0.034 -0.028 0.109 0.172* 0.007
Time the company has existed -0.002 -0.014 0.044 -0.050 -0.069
R² 0.024 0.045 0.024 0.027 0.010
Sig. Anova 0.285 0.025 0.281 0.211 0.791
IA = information asymmetry; RA = role ambiguity; IS = vertical information sharing; MP = managerial performance; BP = 
budgetary participation. 
* Significant at the 5% level.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
It can be observed in Table 6 that the managers of 
closed-capital companies are less likely to participate 
in the budgeting process. The diversity of a company 
may affect the behavior of the subordinates with 
regards to their participation in the budgeting process 
(Merchant, 1984). Sitkin (1996) revealed that open-
capital companies seek constant growth of short-term 
results, which directly leads to more controls and 
greater involvement of subordinates in organizational 
processes, unlike closed-capital companies, in which 
subordinates do not have a high incentive to participate 
in the budgeting process.
In addition, it is verified that individuals in closed-
capital companies with budgeting responsibilities tend to 
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have less role ambiguity. Damodaran (2002) demonstrated 
that owners of closed-capital companies concentrate most 
of their wealth in their own businesses and are concerned 
about the total risk of the activity. Thus, managers of 
closed-capital companies tend to guide their subordinates 
so that they know their real decision-making authority, 
thus reducing the role ambiguity of individuals in the 
organization.
Nationally controlled and industrial organization 
companies are variables that are positively related 
with vertical information sharing between superiors 
and subordinates. With regards to the budget, Parker 
(1978) explains that this is the means through which 
management can communicate with other people in the 
company. The findings of Harrison (1992) demonstrate 
that individuals’ participation in organizational 
processes in national companies is greater due to their 
knowledge of the national culture, which leads to greater 
information sharing, and that subordinates have different 
reactions to communication in companies from different 
nations.
The results of the study demonstrated that controllers, 
controlling managers, and controlling coordinators of 
companies with a greater number of employees are more 
prone to information asymmetry. To operate effectively, 
organizations adapt their structure and their processes 
according to the size of the organization (Covaleski et 
al. 2006). As Merchant (1984) explains, as the number 
of employees grows, there is growth in the number of 
activity channels that require greater information flows, 
which will be reflected in greater information asymmetry.
In general, the results found based on the additional 
analysis with control variables reveal that variables 
involving characteristics of the companies the respondents 
form part of differentiate the effects found in the 
relationships tested in the study. Thus, it is verified that 
the profile of the sample may have been reflected in the 
results revealed in the research.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study analyzed the cognitive effects of vertical 
information sharing in the budgeting process on the 
relationship between budgetary participation and 
managerial performance. The cognitive effects evaluated 
in the research relate to the informative roles of the 
budget and their impacts on information asymmetry, 
on role ambiguity, and on performance. The descriptive 
study was carried out by collecting data and employing 
a qualitative approach to analyze the data, using SEM. 
The sample included 316 respondents who carry out the 
role of controller, controlling manager, or controlling 
coordinator.
The results found show that the direct relationship 
between budgetary participation and performance is not 
statistically significant in the model tested. Budgetary 
participation positively influences vertical information 
sharing, which presented a positive and statistically 
significant influence over the managerial performance 
of the managers who participated in the research. Vertical 
information sharing results from cognitive effects of 
budgetary participation.
Greater levels of vertical information sharing are 
reflected in less role ambiguity and in better managerial 
performance. Even among individuals with budgeting 
responsibilities, when the existence of information 
asymmetry is perceived in the work environment, the 
effects over performance are not significant, which is 
a reflection of the cognitive effects of participation. 
The evidence found enables it to be concluded that the 
organization’s budgetary configuration influences the way 
information sharing will occur and will consequently 
produce cognitive effects on managerial performance. 
Organizations that adopt a participative budgetary 
configuration are more likely to promote vertical 
information sharing, reduce the effects of role ambiguity, 
and improve managerial performance.
These results reveal conditioning effects of the levels 
of information sharing among these relationships 
(participation and performance), determining their 
consequent impacts, which are reflections of this sharing, 
on information asymmetry, on role ambiguity, and 
on managerial performance. These results contribute 
to understanding the mediating cognitive effects of 
information sharing on the relationship between 
participation and performance, revealing that the effects 
of participation on performance may not occur based 
on a simple causality relationship, but rather based on 
certain conditioning factors. This evidence presents 
important implications for the field of studies, since it 
reveals conditions in which participation results in better 
performance, contributing to the understanding of the 
interactions between the variables investigated in this 
study. 
By comparatively analyzing the results found in this 
study for the models that evaluate the direct and indirect 
effects of budgetary participation over the managerial 
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performance of managers of companies that operate in 
Brazil, it can be inferred that, based on the analysis of the 
indirect effects (mediating cognitive effects of information 
sharing), it is possible to better understand the interactions 
in the budgetary context that determine the influence 
of participation on the job performance of individuals.
Even though the results cannot be generalized, this 
evidence encourages new studies to be carried out, by 
providing indications of variables that influence the 
actions of a specific group of managers in the budgetary 
context, in this case controllers, on whom there is still 
little evidence of behavioral variables that influence the 
relationship between budgetary participation and their 
job performance. The need to observe the effects of other 
variables that may influence these relationships reveals the 
opportunity to carry out new studies based on a broader 
theoretical perspective. 
Elements anteceding participation that are present 
in budgeting processes may help in understanding an 
organization’s budgetary configuration and its consequent 
effects on the attitudes, behaviors, and performance of 
these professionals. Cognitive elements related to the 
individuals, such as their personality and psychological 
capacities, may contribute to understanding their actions. 
The reflections of these actions result in attitudes and 
behaviors that generate effects on their performance. 
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